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Abstract
Players are statistical learners who learn about payoffs from data. They may in-
terpret the same data differently, but have common knowledge of a class of learning
procedures. I propose a metric for the analyst’s “confidence” in a strategic prediction,
based on the probability that the prediction is consistent with the realized data. The
main results characterize the analyst’s confidence in a given prediction as the quantity
of data grows large, and provide bounds for small datasets. The approach generates
new predictions, e.g. that speculative trade is more likely given high-dimensional data,
and that coordination is less likely given noisy data.
1 Introduction
Predictions of play in incomplete information games depend crucially on the beliefs of the
agents, but we rarely know what those beliefs are. A standard approach to modeling beliefs
assumes that players share a common prior belief over states of the world, and form posterior
beliefs using Bayesian updating. Under this approach, posterior beliefs that are commonly
known must be identical (Aumann, 1976), and repeated communication of beliefs eventually
leads to agreement (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1982). These implications conflict not
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only with considerable empirical evidence of public and persistent disagreement, but also
with the more basic experience that individuals interpret the same information in different
ways.1
This paper relaxes the assumption of a common prior by supposing that players are
statistical learners: they form beliefs about payoff-relevant parameters based on data, but
potentially disagree on how to interpret that data. I define a learning rule to be any func-
tion that maps data (a sequence of signals) into a belief distribution over payoff-relevant
parameters (a first-order belief). Players have common knowledge of some set of reasonable
learning rules—for example, these learning rules may correspond to Bayesian updating from
a set of prior beliefs, or they may be maps from data to beliefs based on frequentist esti-
mates for the unknown parameter. The special case of a singleton Bayesian learning rule
returns the common prior assumption, but in general, the set of learning rules will produce
different beliefs from the same data, which I interpret as the set of plausible beliefs. I impose
a key restriction to structure the approach: for any realization of the data, each player’s own
belief about the parameter is a plausible belief; they assign probability 1 to all other players
holding plausible beliefs; and so forth. Since the set of plausible beliefs is endogenous to
the (random) data, so too are the strategic predictions that are consistent with this belief
restriction.
The main contribution of the paper is a proposed metric for the analyst’s “confidence” in
a strategic prediction in this game. Specifically, consider the prediction that a given action is
rationalizable. I quantify the analyst’s confidence in this prediction via a confidence set: The
upper bound of the confidence set is the probability that the action is rationalizable given
some belief satisfying the belief restriction, and the lower bound is the probability that the
prediction holds for all beliefs satisfying the restriction. Thus, if both of these probabilities
are equal to one, the analyst has maximal certainty that the action is rationalizable, and if
they are both zero, he has maximal certainty that it is not. In the intermediate cases, there
is uncertainty about whether the action is rationalizable, and the confidence sets present a
way to quantify the extent of that uncertainty.
The main results in this paper characterize various properties of these confidence sets,
beginning with their asymptotic behaviors as the quantity of data grows large. I first show
1For example, in financial markets, individuals publicly disagree in their interpretations of earnings an-
nouncements (Kandel and Pearson, 1995), valuations of financial assets (Carlin et al., 2013), and forecasts
for inflation (Mankiw et al., 2004).
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that if sets of learning rules are too large, then the confidence set may fail to be continuous
at infinite data: that is, even if an action is strictly rationalizable in the limiting infinite-
data game, the analyst’s confidence sets may be very different from t1u for arbitrarily large
quantities of data. Roughly, this is because the rate of convergence under different learning
rules cannot be uniformly bounded, so it is always possible that some learning rule produces
a belief that is very different from the others. If, however, the set of learning rules satisfy
a uniform convergence property that I describe, then the following statements hold: If an
action is strictly rationalizable at the limit, then the analyst’s confidence set must converge
to t1u as the quantity of data gets large, and if an action is not rationalizable in the limit,
the analyst’s confidence set converges to t0u. (The intermediate case, in which actions are
rationalizable but not strictly rationalizable, is more subtle—see Section 4 for further detail.)
Next, I consider the setting of small sample sizes, and bound the extent to which the
analyst’s confidence set differs from its asymptotic limit. These bounds depend on properties
of the learning environment—specifically, the quantity of data, and how fast the different
learning rules jointly recover the payoff-relevant parameter—as well as on a cardinal measure
for how strict the solution is at the limit. I apply these bounds to characterize confidence sets
for example games and sets of learning rules. They allow us to obtain specific, quantitative,
statements about confidence away from the limit of infinite data.
In some cases it is possible to go beyond these bounds, and to fully characterize the
confidence set. Two such examples given in Section 2, where I consider a trade game and a
coordination game. I show that the proposed approach generates novel comparative statics
in these games: Speculative trade is predicted to be more plausible when agents learn from
higher-dimensional data, and coordination is predicted to be less likely when agents observe
noisy data. These predictions—which hold even though data is public and common—are
difficult to produce under assumption of a common prior.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper builds on a literature on the role of the common prior assumption in economic
theory. (See Morris (1995) for a survey of key conceptual points.) Here I focus on an
argument that even if learning does produce common priors in the long run, this does not
imply that we should see common priors given a finite quantity of data, especially if that
data is complex and hard to interpret. Rather than taking the limiting common prior as
3
one that is already reached, I ask what predictions we can make while data is still being
accumulated. The confidence sets introduced in this paper provide a quantitative account
of whether predictions implied by a (limiting) common prior also hold for small data sets.2
This paper also contributes to a literature on the robustness of strategic predictions
to the specification of player beliefs (Rubinstein, 1989; Dekel et al., 2006; Weinstein and
Yildiz, 2007; Chen et al., 2010; Ely and Peski, 2011) and equilibrium selection in incomplete
information games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Kajii and Morris, 1997). At a technical
level, the actions that are rationalizable under the belief restriction that I impose are ∆-
rationalizable strategies of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003), where the set ∆ of first-order
belief restrictions is endogenous to a learning process.3 The permitted types converge in
the uniform-weak topology, as proposed and characterized in Chen, di Tillio, Faingold, and
Xiong (2010) and Chen, di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2017), and I use results about this
topology to prove several of the main results.
Conceptually, the goals of the present paper differ from the previous literature in several
respects: First, my focus here is not on equilibrium selection—choosing one equilibrium
from a set of many—but rather on providing a metric for confidence in a given prediction.
Second, in contrast to the many binary or “qualitative” notions of robustness that have been
proposed, this paper delivers a quantitative metric. Third, while the literature has primarily
considered robustness to perturbations of beliefs, I am interested here also in predictions that
we may make for beliefs that are far from the limiting beliefs. To discipline these beliefs, I
endogenize the type space using a statistical learning foundation for belief formation. This
aspect of the paper—combining learning foundations with game theoretic implications—
connects to papers such as Dekel et al. (2004), Esponda (2013), and Steiner and Stewart
(2008), among others.4 The modeling of agents as “statisticians” or “machine learners”
relates to a growing literature in decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2003; Gayer et al.,
2007; Al-Najjar, 2009; Al-Najjar and Pai, 2014) and game theory (Jehiel, 2005; Spiegler,
2016; Olea et al., 2017; Salant and Cherry, 2020; Haghtalab et al., 2020). Of these papers,
2Other reasons that the common prior is tenuous include that the data itself may lead to incomplete
learning if it is endogenously acquired, and that convergence of individual beliefs need not imply convergence
in beliefs about beliefs (Cripps et al., 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2015).
3Such belief restrictions have also been usefully applied in the work of Ollar and Penta (2017), among
others.
4Brandenburger et al. (2008) and Battigalli and Prestipino (2011) also motivate small type structures as
emerging from learning, although they do not explicitly model a dynamic learning process.
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Steiner and Stewart (2008) and Salant and Cherry (2020) are closest: Steiner and Stewart
(2008) characterizes the limiting equilibria of a sequence of games in which players infer
payoffs from related games, and Salant and Cherry (2020) models players as statisticians
who form beliefs about the action distribution based on statistical inference from a sample
of observed players. My goal here differs in that it is to provide a metric of robustness rather
than a new solution concept.
2 Examples
In this section, I use the proposed approach to revisit some classic examples—a two-player
coordination game and a two-player trading game. In each of these games, the assumption
that players share a common prior has strong implications for strategic play. I show how we
can relax this assumption by endogenizing disagreement based on two new primitives: a data-
generating process and set of learning rules. This approach allows us to relate confidence in
a strategic prediction to primitives of the learning environment.
2.1 Trade
A Seller owns a good of unknown value v P t0, 1u. He can either enter a market at cost
c, or exit and keep the good. Entering leads to a simultaneous interaction with a Buyer,
where the Seller chooses whether to sell the good at a (pre-set) posted price p, and the Buyer
chooses whether to purchase the good at that price. The game and its payoffs are described
in Figure 1 below.
Enter Exit
Sell Don’t Sell
Buy v  p, p c 0, v c
Don’t Buy 0, v c 0, v c
(0, v)
Seller
Figure 1: Description of Game
Suppose that the cost c and price p satisfy 0 ă c ă p ă 1, so the Seller prefers to sell
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at the low value and prefers to keep the good at the high value. If players share a common
prior about v, then entering is not rationalizable for the Seller in this game, so trade will
not occur (similar to the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982)).5
I suppose instead that player form beliefs based on a common data set of past goods and
their valuations, but draw inferences from this data in different ways. Each good in the data
is described by m observable attributes with values normalized to lie in the interval r´1, 1s.
Typical attributes are denoted x P X :“ r´1, 1sm, and the value of a good is a deterministic
function f : X Ñ t0, 1u of its attributes. The public data zn “ tpxi, fpxiqquni“1 is a sequence
of n goods with attributes xi drawn from a uniform distribution on X, and the values of
these goods.
Players have common knowledge that f belongs to a certain family of functions F ,
which we can think of as the relevant set of models. For simplicity, let F be the set of
rectangular classification rules, i.e. functions fRpxq “ 1px P Rq indexed to hyper-rectangles
R in r´1, 1sm.6 The attributes of the Seller’s good are known to be the zero-vector, denoted
xS, so the agent’s beliefs over F determine their beliefs about v “ fpxSq, the value of the
Seller’s good.7
Agents may have different prior beliefs pi P ∆pFq over the set of models. Fixing a prior
pi, the posterior belief pipf | znq given data zn is a re-normalization of the prior over all rules
consistent with the observed data (see Figure 2), and the posterior probability assigned to
the Seller’s good having a high value is piptf : fpxSq “ 1u | znq. Define Bpznq Ď ∆pt0, 1uq to
be the set of all posterior beliefs about v that are consistent with Bayesian updating from
some prior pi P ∆pFq and the data zn.
Without making detailed assumptions about the priors that players hold, or the beliefs
that players have about the priors of other players, I place the following restriction.
Assumption 1 (Restriction on Beliefs). For every realized zn, players have common cer-
5If trade does not occur subsequently, then the Seller receives v ´ c from entering but v ą v ´ c from
exiting. Thus, entering can be rationalized only if trade subsequently occurs. But trade can occur only if the
Buyer believes that Epvq ě p while the Seller believes that Epvq ď p, implying Epvq “ p under their shared
belief. The Seller can improve on his expected payoff of p´ c by choosing to exit.
6For example, whether all attributes fall into an “acceptable” range, as judged by a downstream buyer.
7In more detail, the state space is Ω “ F ˆ pX ˆ t0, 1uq8 and the payoff-relevant parameter is fpxSq.
Agents have a prior belief q over Ω, where margF q has support on the set of models R. Conditional on the
true model being f , the data-generating process over pXˆt0, 1uq8 is qppx, yq | fq “ gpxq ¨1py “ fpxqq where
g is the uniform density on X.
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1
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+1
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(xi, f(xi))
f(xi) = 1
f(xi) = 0
Figure 2: The circles represent the observed data. Each good is described by a vector in r´1, 1s ˆ r´1, 1s.
The circle is black if its valuation is 1 and gray if its valuation is low. A rule is consistent with the data if it
correctly predicts the valuation for each observation. Two rectangular classification rules are depicted: each
predicts ‘1’ for goods in the shaded region and ‘0’ for goods outside. Both are consistent with the observed
data.
tainty in the event that all players have a first-order belief in Bpznq.8
That is, players are assumed to have beliefs consistent with Bayesian updating from some
prior on F ; they assign probability 1 to the other player having a posterior belief in this set,
and so on.
The analyst’s (ex-ante) confidence in predicting that entering is rationalizable for the
Seller is defined as follows: For every number of observations n, let pn be the measure of data
sets zn such that entering is rationalizable for some belief satisfying Assumption 1, and let
pn be the measure of data sets zn such that entering is rationalizable for all beliefs satisfying
Assumption 1. Then the set rpn, pns represents a “confidence set” that describes how certain
the analyst should be in predicting that the entering is rationalizable, when agents observe n
common data points. The extreme case of pn “ pn “ 1 implies full confidence that entering
is rationalizable, while pn “ pn “ 0 implies full confidence that it is not.
Claim 1. The probability pn “ 0 for every n P Z`. Additionally:
(a) Fixing any number of attributes m P Z`, the probability pn Ñ 0 as nÑ 8.
(b) Fixing any number of data observations n P Z`, the probability pn is increasing in the
number of attributes m, and pn Ñ 1 as mÑ 8.
8See Section 3.2 for the precise definition of common certainty in such an event.
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That is, for every quantity of data n, the probability that entering is rationalizable for
all beliefs satisfying Assumption 1 is zero. But the probability that entering is rationalizable
for some belief satisfying Assumption 1 varies depending on n and m. Part (a) says that as
the number of observations n grows large, the probability pn vanishes to zero, implying that
the confidence set converges to a degenerate interval at zero. The infinite-data limit thus
returns the prediction of “no trade” consistent with the common prior assumption. But if the
quantity of data is finite, and the number of attributes is large, then pn can be substantially
greater than zero. Indeed, Part (b) of the claim says that this probability pn can be made
arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the dimensionality of the learning problem via choice of
large m. This reflects that in a high-dimensional learning problem, many classification rules
are likely to be consistent with the data, including some that yield conflicting predictions.
Thus, “rational” disagreement is possible and even likely.
An exact characterization of rpn, pns is given in Lemma 3 in the appendix. Using this
lemma, I plot in Figure 3 the behavior of these confidence sets for different values of m,
assuming the true function to be 1px P r´0.1, 0.1smq. Although trade is not predicted in
the limiting game, it is a plausible outcome if the number of data observations is small and
the number of attributes is large. As one specific example: If there are 10 attributes and
players observe only 20 goods, then the confidence set rpn, pns “ r0, 0.99s. That is, with
near certainty, entering will be rationalizable for the Seller given the realized data for some
belief satisfying Assumption 1. While I chose a simple set of learning rules for the purpose
of obtaining exact expressions for the confidence set, in practice confidence sets like those
depicted in Figure 3 can be simulated for more complex kinds of learning procedures.
20 40 60 80 100
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Number of observations n Number of observations n Number of observations n
20 40 60 80 100
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
20 40 60 80 100
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a) m = 1 (b) m = 10 (c) m = 100
pn
pn
pn
pn
pn
pn
Figure 3: The shaded area depicts confidence sets rpn, pns for the rationalizability of entering
given n common observations.
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2.2 Coordination
I now turn to a second classic game, where (in contrast to the previous example) the pre-
diction of interest holds in the infinite-data limit. I characterize the robustness of that
prediction when players have beliefs based on small quantities of data.
A contagious disease spreads across a population at an unknown speed. Two states are
connected by travel, and their governors choose between implementing a strong or a weak
lockdown policy in their states to slow the spread of the disease. Implementation of the
strong lockdown policy entails a large economic cost, but if the states coordinate on this
policy, then the disease will be suppressed with certainty.
The two governors form beliefs about the growth rate of the disease based on a public
data set tpt, ytqunt“1, which consists of the number of reported cases of the disease, yt, on
days t “ 1, 2, . . . , n. The number of reported cases grows exponentially according to
log yt “ βt` εt
where the noise term εt has a normal distribution with known parameters µ “ 0 and σ2 ą 0.
The constant β is not known. Payoffs are given by the following matrix:
Strong Weak
Strong ´1,´1 ´1´ β,´β
Weak ´β,´1´ β ´β,´β
The economic cost of the strong lockdown is normalized to 1, and the cost of letting the
disease progress without a strong lockdown is given by its growth rate β. A weak lockdown is
strictly dominant if β ă 1, but coordination on the strong lockdown is the Pareto-dominant
Nash equilibrium if β ą 1.
Since the data is public, the assumption of a common prior over the parameter β restricts
agents to identical posterior beliefs. This rules out, for example, the possibility that a
governor chooses the weak policy, not because he infers from the data that the disease is
low-risk, but because he believes that the other governor may make such an inference.
In practice, agents use statistical procedures to infer β from the data. I thus relax the
assumption of a common prior in the following way. Define βˆpznq to be the ordinary least-
squares estimate of β from the data zn :“ tpt, log ytqunt“1, and let φn be the constant such
9
that C pznq “ tβ : |β ´ βˆpznq| ď φnu is a p1 ´ αq-confidence interval for β, where α P p0, 1q
is fixed. Suppose the governors have common certainty in the event that both of their first-
order beliefs have support on C pznq; that is, each governor’s own belief about the value of β
has support in this confidence interval; they assign probability 1 to the other agent having
such a belief; and so forth. This allows players to disagree given the data, but requires the
size of that disagreement to be confined within the confidence interval. (The assumption
that players assign common certainty is not crucial. Similar results go through if the players
have common p-belief (Monderer and Samet, 1989) in the set for large p, so long as we bound
the parameter space for β. See Section 6.)
Claim 2. Suppose that the actual growth rate is fast pβ ą 1), so that the strong lockdown
is rationalizable given complete information of the payoffs. Then, for every σ2 ą 0, both pn
and pn are increasing in n, while for every n, both pn and pn are decreasing in σ2.
That is, the analyst gains confidence in predicting that the strong lockdown is ratio-
nalizable as the reporting noise σ2 decreases, and the number of observations n increases.9
Lemma 3 in the appendix explicitly characterizes pn and pn. Using the expressions in this
lemma, I plot in Figure 4 the behavior of these confidence sets for different levels of reporting
noise σ.
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Number of observations n Number of observations n Number of observations n
(c)  = 1000(b) = 100(a) = 10
pn
pn
pn
pn
pn
pn
Figure 4: The shaded area depicts confidence sets rpn, pns for the rationalizability of the
strong lockdown given n common observations, and allowing the reporting noise σ to vary.
In all panels, β “ 2 and α “ 0.05.
As the number of observations n grows, both pn and pn increase as well. If the number
of observations is large relative to the reporting noise, then the analyst should have high
9If instead β ă 1, then the reverse statements hold; that is, the probabilities pn and pn are decreasing in
n and increasing in σ2.
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confidence that the strong lockdown policy is rationalizable—for example, if σ “ 10 and
n “ 100, then the confidence set r0.99, 1s is nearly degenerate at certainty. On the other
hand, if the reporting noise is large and the number of observations is relatively small, then
the strong lockdown is likely to be rationalizable for some permitted types, but not for all
of them—for example, if σ “ n “ 100, then the confidence set is r0.08, 0.99s, suggesting
substantial ambiguity regarding whether the strong lockdown is a good prediction of play.
Subsequently, I generalize the approach described in these two examples.
3 Approach
3.1 Preliminaries
Basic Game. There is a finite set I of players and a finite set of actions Ai for each player
i. The set of action profiles is A “ śiPI Ai, and the set of possible games is identified
with U :“ R|I|ˆ|A|. Agents have beliefs over a set of payoff-relevant parameters Θ, which is
a compact and convex subset of finite-dimensional Euclidean space. It is possible to take
Θ to be a subset of U , so that each θ is itself a game, or to define beliefs over a lower-
dimensional set of payoff-relevant parameters as in Section 2. In either case, the parameters
in Θ are assumed to be related to payoffs by a bounded and Lipschitz continuous embedding
g : Θ Ñ U (assuming the sup-norm on both spaces).10
Beliefs. For each player i, let X0i “ Θ, X1i “ X0i ˆ
ś
j‰i ∆pX0j q, . . . , Xni “ Xn´1i ˆś
j‰i ∆pXn´1j q, etc., so that each Xki is the set of possible k-th order beliefs for player i.
Define T 0i “
ś8
n“0 ∆pX inq. An element pt1i , t2i , . . . q P T 0i is a hierarchy of beliefs over Θ
(describing the player’s uncertainty over Θ, his uncertainty over his opponents’ uncertainty
over Θ, and so forth), and referred to simply as a belief or type.11 There is a subset of
types Ti˚ (that satisfy the property of coherency
12 and common knowledge of coherency)
and a function κi˚ : Ti˚ Ñ ∆
`
Θˆ T ˚´i
˘
such that κi˚ ptiq preserves the beliefs in ti; that
is, margXn´1 κi˚ ptiq “ tni for every n (Mertens and Zamir, 1985; Brandenburger and Dekel,
10The map g can be interpreted as capturing the known information about the structure of payoffs.
11Types are sometimes modeled as encompassing all uncertainty in the game. In the present paper,
types describe players’ structural uncertainty over payoffs, but not their strategic uncertainty over opponent
actions.
12margXn´2 t
n
i “ tn´1i , so that pt1i , t2i , . . . q is a consistent stochastic process.
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1993).13 The tuple pTi˚ , κi˚ qiPI is the universal type space. Subsequently I will develop smaller
type spaces pTi, κiqiPI where each Ti Ď Ti˚ and κi : Ti Ñ κi˚ pTiq is the restriction of κi˚ to Ti.
3.2 Restriction on Beliefs
The proposed approach endogenizes the type space based on two new primitives: a data-
generating process, and a set of rules for how to extrapolate beliefs from realized data.
Formally, let pZtqtPZ` be a stochastic process where the random variables Zt take value in a
common set Z, and the typical sample path is denoted z “ pz1, z2, . . . q. The data-generating
process is a measure P over the set Z8 of all (infinite) sample paths. Let P n denote the
induced measure on the first n variables. A data set zn of size n is the restriction of z to its
first n coordinates, and Zn is the set of all length-n data sets. I use Zn “ pZ1, . . . , Znq to
denote the random initial sequence of length n.14
A learning rule is defined to be any map from data sets into first-order beliefs:
µ :
8ď
n“1
Zn Ñ ∆pΘq.
The special case of Bayesian learning rule is identified with a distribution on Θ along with a
family of distributions pPθqθPΘ, where each Pθ P ∆pZ8q is the data-generating distribution
given parameter θ. The realized data zn determines a posterior distribution on Θ ˆ Z8,
and the learning rule maps this data into the marginal posterior distribution on Θ.15 Other
learning rules may map the data zn to a degenerate belief at a sample statistic (such as the
empirical average) or to a distribution over various point-estimates for θ.
Players have common knowledge of a set M of learning rules.16 The set of plausible
beliefs given this set M and realized data set zn is defined
Bpznq “ tµpznq : µ PMu Ď ∆pΘq. (1)
13The notation T ˚´i is used throughout the paper to denote the set of profiles of opponent types,
ś
j‰i Tj˚ .
14Throughout, symbols such as Zt and Z
n denote random variables, whereas lowercase symbols such as
zn are particular, constant values.
15In general, making the mapping deterministic may require choosing a conditional probability if there
are multiple ones consistent with Bayes’ rule; here and elsewhere in the paper, implicitly assume that the
updating rule specifies such a choice when Bayesian rules are mentioned.
16Note that this set is common across players.
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Throughout this paper, I restrict consideration to sets of learning rules M that satisfy the
following condition:
Assumption 2 (Common Limiting Belief). There is a limiting belief µ8 such that
lim
nÑ8 dP pµpZ
nq, µ8q Ñ 0 P -a.s. @µ PM
where dP is the Prokhorov metric on Θ.
17
This assumption requires that all learning rules in M return the same limiting belief µ8
as the quantity of data n grows large.18 It is not critical that all differences in beliefs are
removed in the limit (see Section 6). But maintaining Assumption 2 in the main text allows
us to explore more precisely the scope for disagreement in an environment in which learning
is feasible, but not immediate. While learning has not ceased, the available information may
permit multiple different interpretations, producing differences in beliefs.
I use the sets of plausible beliefs Bpznq to impose a restriction on hierarchies of beliefs,
as in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003). Specifically, players are assumed to have common
certainty in the event that all players have first-order beliefs in Bpznq—that is, they have a
first-order belief in this set, believe with probability 1 that all other players have a first-order
belief in this set, and so forth (Monderer and Samet, 1989).19
Formally, for any set B Ď ∆pΘq, and for any player i, define
B1,1i pBq :“ tti P T ˚i : margΘ κi˚ ptiq P Bu
to be the set of player i types whose marginal beliefs over Θ belong to the set B. For each
k ą 1, and again for each player i, recursively define20
Bk,1i pBq “
#
ti P T ˚i : κ˚i ptiq
˜
Θˆ
ź
j‰i
Bk´1,1j pBq
¸
“ 1
+
.
17For any ν, ν1 P ∆pΘq, the Prokhorov distance between these measures is dP pν, ν1q “ inft ą 0 : νpAq ď
ν1pAq `  for all Borel-measurable A Ď Θu, where A denotes the -neighborhood of A in the sup-norm.
18This limiting belief µ8 can be interpreted as a common prior, following what Morris (1995) calls the
“frequentist justification” for assumption of a common prior.
19As I discuss in Section 6, it is not critical that players have common certainty in this event, and the
restriction can be relaxed to common p-belief for large p.
20 For example, B2,1i pBq is the set of player i types that assign probability 1 to all other players assigning
probability 1 to B.
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Then finally, TBi “
Ş
kě1B
k,1
i pBq is the set of player i types that have common certainty in
the event that all players’ first-order beliefs belong to B.
Definition 1. For every zn, the induced type space is
´
T
Bpznq
i , κ
Bpznq
i
¯
iPI
, where κ
Bpznq
i :
T
Bpznq
i Ñ κi˚
´
T
Bpznq
i
¯
is the restriction of κi˚ to T
Bpznq
i .
21 The type ti is permitted for player
i if ti P TBpznqi .
This type space includes all type profiles where each player i has common certainty in
the event that all players have first-order beliefs in Bpznq. Note that the type space permits
common knowledge disagreement—that is, player i can believe with probability 1 that (all
believe with probability 1 that...) players hold different first-order beliefs. Such types are
precluded under the common prior assumption not only in the present setting of common
data, but also if we were to allow for private and different information (Aumann, 1976). The
induced type spaces in Definition 1 thus corresponds to a relaxation of the common prior
assumption, where the permitted extent of disagreement is governed by the set of learning
rulesM. In the special case in whichM consists of a singleton Bayesian rule, then we return
the common prior assumption.
In this approach, restrictions are placed only on the beliefs that players hold on the
exogenous parameter space Θ, and not on how they came to form those beliefs. For example,
each of the following is consistent with the restriction in Definition 1:
• (Common Knowledge) Each player i is associated with a player-specific learning rule
µi PM. It is common knowledge that given any data set zn, each player i’s first-order
belief is µipznq.
• (Randomization) Each player i randomizes over learning rules in M using a player-
specific distribution Qi P ∆pMq, and applies the randomly drawn learning rule to
the realized data to form a first-order belief. The distributions pQiqiPM are common
knowledge, although the realized random rule is privately known.
• (Misspecification.) Player j believes with probability 1 that player i’s first order belief
is µpznq for every data set zn, whereas in fact player i’s first-order belief is µ1pznq for
a different learning rule µ1 PM.
21It is straightforward to show that the type sets T
Bpznq
i are belief-closed ; that is,
κ
Bpznq
i ptiq
´
Θˆ TBpznq´i
¯
“ 1 for every ti P TBpznqi .
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It is possible sometimes to take Bpznq as the primitive without explicitly defining M
(as in the coordination example in Section 2.2), so that each measure P n directly defines
a measure over sets of first-order beliefs.22 In other cases, it is more natural to define M.
Some examples for this set include:
Bayesian Updating with Different Priors. Each learning rule µpi P M is identified with a
prior distribution pi P ∆pΘˆZ8q. For any realized data zn, the belief µpipznq is the marginal
over Θ of the posterior belief associated with the corresponding prior pi.
Sample Statistics. The set M consists of learning rules that map the data to different
point-estimates for the payoff-relevant parameter. For example,M might consist of the two
learning rules µmean and µmedian, where for any data set zn, µmeanpznq is a point-mass belief
on the mean realization in zn (as in Jehiel (2018)), and µmedianpznq is a point-mass belief on
the median realization.
Linear Regression. Suppose that X Ď Rp, p ă 8, is a set of attributes that determine the
value of a parameter in Θ (e.g. physical covariates of a patient seeking health insurance,
and medical outcomes for those patients). The observations in zn are pairs px, θq, and the
payoff-relevant unknown is the parameter associated with some new x˚ (e.g. the outcome
for a new patient with characteristics x˚).
Each learning rule µ PM corresponds to a different regression model based on a subset
of attributes Iµ Ď t1, . . . , pu (as for example in Olea et al. (2017)). Write xµ “ pxiqiPIµ
for the coordinates of x at those indices. Then, fˆOLSµ rznspxq “ βOLSµ ¨ xµ is the linear
function of the attributes in Iµ that best fits the observed data zn “ tpxk, θkqunk“1; that is,
βOLSµ “ argminβPR|Iµ| 1n
řn
i“1pβ ¨ xkµ ´ θkq2. For every zn, the learning rule µ maps zn into a
point-mass belief on the corresponding prediction fˆOLSµ rznspx˚q.
Case-Based Learning with Different Similarity Functions. As in the previous example, sup-
pose that the observations are pairs px, θq P X ˆ Θ, and the payoff-relevant parameter
is the outcome at some new x˚. Each “case-based” learning rule µ P M is identified
with a real number λ P R` (to be interpreted momentarily) and maps the historical data
22The definition of Bpznq must, however, respect Assumption 2. However, there must exist some set of
learning rules M that could be defined, which respects Assumption 2 and gives rise to these sets Bpznq. A
sufficient condition is for there to exist a P -measure 1 set of sequences Z˚ Ď Z8 such that for every z P Z˚,
and every sequence pνnq8n“1 satisfying νn P Bpznq for each n, it holds that limnÑ8 dP pνn, µ8q “ 0.
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zn “ tpxk, θkqunk“1 into a weighted average of the observed parameter values θk (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1995).
The observed parameters at x-values “more similar” to x˚ are weighted more heavily.
Formally, let g : XˆX Ñ R` be a similarity function on attributes, where gpx, x1q describes
the distance between attribute vectors x and x1. The learning rule with parameter λ maps
zn to a point mass on the weighted average
1
n
řn
k“1 θ
k ¨ pe´λgµpxk,x˚qq{přk1 e´λgµpxk1 ,x˚qq. The
parameter λ controls the degree to which similar observations are weighted more heavily than
dissimilar observations. For example, λ “ 0 returns a simple average of all of the observed
states, while λÑ 8 returns the observed state at the most similar attribute vector.
3.3 Analyst’s Confidence Set
I now use the proposed framework to construct a quantitative metric for the analyst’s con-
fidence in a strategic prediction, focusing on prediction that an action is interim-correlated
rationalizable (Dekel et al., 2007; Weinstein and Yildiz, 2017). The use of this particular
solution concept is not critical to the approach—for example, we could study the agent’s
confidence in prediction of Bayesian Nash equilibria (see Section 6)—but interim-correlated
rationalizability is well-suited to the present setting, where agents may have common knowl-
edge disagreement.23 Its definition is reviewed here:
For every player i and type ti P Ti˚ , set S0i rtis “ Ai, and define Ski rtis for k ě 1 such
that ai P Ski rtis if and only if ai is a best reply to some pi P ∆pΘ ˆ T ˚´i ˆ A´iq satisfying
(1) margΘˆT˚´i pi “ κi˚ ptiq and (2) margA´iˆT´i pipta´i, t´iq | a´i P Sk´1´i rt´isuq “ 1, where
Sk´1´i rt´is “
ś
j‰i S
k´1
j rt´js. We can interpret pi to be an extension of type ti’s belief κi˚ ptiq
onto the space ∆pΘ ˆ T´i ˆ A´iq, with support in the set of actions that survive k ´ 1
rounds of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies for types in T´i. For every
i, the actions in S8i rtis “
Ş8
k“0 S
k
i rtis are interim correlated rationalizable for type ti, or
(henceforth) simply rationalizable. Say that ai is strictly rationalizable for type ti if the best
reply conditions above are strengthened to strict best replies.
For any set of beliefs B Ď ∆pΘq, say that action ai is strongly B-rationalizable if it is
23Equilibrium notions are known to lead to potentially counterintuitive predictions when players have
common knowledge disagreement. For example, consider a matching pennies game where player 1 receives
θ if players match and ´θ otherwise, and player 2 receives ´θ if the players match and θ otherwise. Let
θ P t´1, 1u. Then if player 1 assigns probability 1 to θ “ 1 while player 2 assigns probability 1 to θ “ ´1, it
is (somewhat counterintuitively) a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for both players to choose match. See Dekel
et al. (2004) for an extended discussion.
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rationalizable for player i with any type ti P TBi , and it is weakly B-rationalizable if it is
rationalizable for player i with some type ti P TBi .24 Strong and weakB-rationalizability rep-
resent (respectively) maximally stringent and maximally lenient approaches for determining
whether ai constitutes a “reasonable” prediction in the interim type space
`
TBi , κ
B
i
˘
iPI .
25
The main concept of a confidence set is now defined.
Definition 2. For every n P Z`, define pnpaiq to be the probability (over possible datasets
zn) that action ai is rationalizable for every type in T
Bpznq
i ; that is,
pnpaiq “ P n ptzn : ai is strongly Bpznq-rationalizableuq . (2)
Define pnpaiq to be the probability (over possible datasets zn) that action ai is rationalizable
for some type ti P TBpznqi ; that is,
pnpaiq “ P n ptzn : ai is weakly Bpznq-rationalizableuq . (3)
The confidence set for rationalizability of ai given n observations is rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs.
The larger pnpaiq and pnpaiq are, the more confident an analyst should be in predicting
that ai is rationalizable. At extremes: If p
npaiq “ pnpaiq “ 1, then given observation of n
random samples, action ai is guaranteed to be rationalizable for player i (for all permitted
types). If pnpaiq “ pnpaiq “ 0, then action ai is guaranteed to not be rationalizable for
player i (for any permitted types). In the intermediate cases, if 0 ă pnpaiq “ pnpaiq ă 1,
then rationalizability of the action ai depends on the specific realization of the data, and if
pnpaiq ă pnpaiq, then the prediction requires assumptions on the details of the agent’s belief
beyond Assumption 1.26
Observation 1. For every player i and action ai P Ai:
24Whether an action ai is interim-correlated rationalizable for some type ti does not depend on the
description of the underlying type space (Dekel et al., 2007). Hence we only need to define rationalizability
for the universal type space, even though the type spaces that we will work with are the smaller type spaces´
T
Bpznq
i , κ
Bpznq
i
¯
, and they vary depending on the data zn.
25Given the restriction in Definition 1, the weakly B-rationalizable strategies are the ∆-rationalizable
strategies of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003), where ∆ “ p∆iqiPI and each ∆i “ tν P ∆pΘ ˆ T´i ˆ A´iq |
margΘ µ P Bu encodes the belief restriction that first-order beliefs belong to B. The concept of strong
B-rationalizability can be interpreted as a “robust” version of ∆-rationalizability.
26I do not comment here on what further assumptions may be imposed, interpreting this case simply as
one in which the prediction is tenuous.
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(a) pnpaiq ď pnpaiq for every n P Z`.
(c) If M consists of a single learning rule, then pnpaiq “ pnpaiq for every n P Z`.
In the special case in which agents have a common prior, the definitions in pnpaiq and
pnpaiq have the following familiar interpretation:
Remark 1. (Common Prior.) Suppose that players share a common prior over ΘˆZ8 and
for simplicity let Z be finite. Write µ for the learning rule that maps zn into the induced
posterior belief over Θ under the common prior. Then, each realization zn determines an
interim game, where players all have common certainty in the posterior belief. Moreover,
the common prior determines a distribution over zn, and hence over possible interim games.
For any player i and action ai, the probabilities p
npaiq “ pnpaiq, and are equal to the
measure of size-n datasets zn (under the common prior
27) with the property that action ai
is rationalizable for player i in the corresponding interim game.28
In the above approach, the common prior serves multiple roles: it determines the true
distribution over the data that agents might see, and also determines how agents update
from that data. When we separate these roles, we can still use an objective data-generating
process to define a measure over interim games, as I do here. In this way, the probabilities
pnpaiq and pnpaiq are a natural generalization of a standard measure of the typicality of a
strategic prediction, in the absence of a common prior.
4 Asymptotic Results
The subsequent sections study how confidence sets depend on the underlying learning envi-
ronment and the game in question. I first consider the limiting behavior of the probabilities
pnpaiq and pnpaiq as the quantity of data n gets large. Recall that by Assumption 2, the
beliefs induced by the different learning rules converge to a limiting belief µ8. Thus, the
n “ 8 limit corresponds to an incomplete information game in which players have common
certainty in the event that every player has first-order belief µ8. Whether the probabilities
27A small difference in the formulations is that pnpaiq and pnpaiq are defined using the “true” probability
measure P P ∆pZ8q in the present approach, instead of a measure Q P ∆pΘˆ Z8q.
28This approach is used for example in Kajii and Morris (1997) (if we re-interpret the histories zn as the
states), where an incomplete information game is “close” to a complete information game if the payoffs of
the complete information game occur with high probability under the prior.
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pnpaiq and pnpaiq are continuous at n “ 8 tells us how sensitive rationalizability of ai is to
an assumption that agents have coordinated their beliefs using infinite data. When these
probabilities are discontinuous at n “ 8, then the infinite-data prediction is fragile—that
is, the analyst would make a different prediction for arbitrarily large but finite quantities of
data.
Formally, let t8i be the player i type with common certainty in the event that each player’s
first-order belief is µ8. Then define p8paiq “ p8paiq “ 1 if the action ai is rationalizable for
type t8i , and define p8paiq “ p8paiq “ 0 if it is not.
Definition 3. The confidence set for action ai is asymptotically continuous if
lim
nÑ8rp
npaiq, pnpaiqs “ rp8paiq, p8paiqs.
4.1 Fragile Predictions
Whether confidence sets are asymptotically continuous depends crucially on whether the
beliefs induced by the different learning rules converge uniformly to µ8.
Assumption 3 (Uniform Convergence). limnÑ8 supµPM dP pµpZnq, µ8q “ 0 P -a.s., where
dP is the Prokhorov metric on ∆pΘq.
Assumption 2 already implies that for each learning rule µ PM, the (random) induced
belief µpZnq almost surely converges to µ8 as the quantity of data n grows large. Assumption
3 strengthens this by requiring additionally that the speed of convergence does not vary too
much across the different learning rules in M. Specifically, the sequence of beliefs tµpZnqu
must converge to µ8 (as nÑ 8) uniformly across µ PM.
A sufficient condition for Assumption 3 to hold is that the set of learning rules M is
finite. But failures of Assumption 3 occur for classes of learning rules that we may consider
plausible. In particular, Assumption 3 fails if the class M is too rich, as in the following
example:
Example 1 (Rich Sets of Priors and Likelihoods). An unknown parameter v takes values
in t0, 1u. Players commonly observe a sequence of realizations from the set Z “ t0, 1u.
Learning rules µpi,q P M are indexed to parameters pi P p0, 1q and q P p1{2, 1q, where the
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parameter pi is the prior probability of value 1, and q identifies the following signal structure:
z “ 0 z “ 1
v “ 0 q 1´ q
v “ 1 1´ q 1
Each rule µpi,q is identified with prior pi and signal structure q, and maps the observed signal
outcomes into the posterior belief over t0, 1u. Assume that the true data-generating process
belongs to this class; that is, there exists some q˚ P p1{2, 1q such that the distribution over
the signal set t0, 1u is pq˚, 1´q˚q when v “ 0, and the distribution is p1´q˚, q˚q when v “ 1.
In this example, all learning rules lead to the same belief (that is, there is asymptotic
agreement in the sense of Acemoglu et al. (2015)). But because the rate of this conver-
gence cannot be uniformly bounded across the different learning rules, it is possible for the
confidence set to be discontinuous at n “ 8.
Claim 3. Consider the trading game described in Section 2, and the data-generating pro-
cess and set of learning rules from Example 1. Then, limnÑ8rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs “ r0, 1s, while
rp8paiq, p8paiqs “ t0u, so the prediction that entering is not rationalizable for the Seller is
not asymptotically continuous.
The claim tells us that although trade will not occur in the limiting game, this prediction
is sensitive to the assumption that agents have indeed coordinated their priors using infinite
data. Even if the amount of data that players commonly observed were to be arbitrarily
large, the analyst should nevertheless consider trade to be a plausible outcome.
4.2 Asymptotic Continuity
In contrast, when the assumption of uniform convergence is satisfied, then the limiting
confidence sets can be tightly linked to predictions in the limiting game.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 3 is satisfied.
(a) If ai is strictly rationalizable for player i of type t
8
i , then
limnÑ8rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs “ t1u.
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(b) If ai is not rationalizable for player i of type t
8
i , then
lim
nÑ8rp
npaiq, pnpaiqs “ t0u.
This theorem says that if an action ai is strictly rationalizable for player i given infinite
data, then pnpaiq and pnpaiq both converge to 1 as n grows large.29 Thus, when agents
observe sufficiently large quantities of public data, the analyst should be arbitrarily confident
in predicting that ai is rationalizable. On the other hand, if action ai is not rationalizable
given infinite data, then pnpaiq and pnpaiq both converge to 0, so the analyst should be
arbitrarily confident in predicting that ai is not rationalizable for large data sets.
30
Theorem 1 builds on results from the literature on topologies on the universal type space.
Consider any sequence of types ptni q8n“1 where each ti P TBpznqi . Under Assumption 3, as the
quantity of data n gets large, the types tni (almost surely) have common certainty that
first-order beliefs lie in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the limiting belief µ8. Thus,
the sequence ptni q can be shown to converge to t8i , in the uniform-weak topology (Chen
et al., 2010) on the universal type space (see Lemma 4). Since rationalizability is upper
hemi-continuous in the uniform-weak topology (Chen et al., 2010), Part (b) of the theorem
follows.
Part (a) of the theorem is related to lower hemi-continuity of strict rationalizability in
the uniform-weak topology (as shown in Chen et al. (2010)),31 but this property is not
sufficient. Lower hemi-continuity guarantees that for any sequence of types ptni q8n“1 from
T
Bpznq
i , the action ai must eventually be rationalizable along the sequence, but the rates
of this convergence can differ substantially across different sequences. For eventual strong
29If the limiting belief µ8 is degenerate at a limiting parameter θ8, and players have common certainty
that players’ first-order beliefs have support in a shrinking neighborhood of θ8 (see Section 5.1 for a more
formal development), then the property that pnpaiq Ñ 1 is equivalent to the property that ai is robustly
rationalizable, as defined in Morris et al. (2012), with the small difference that Morris et al. (2012) consider
almost common belief in the exact parameter θ8, while I consider common certainty in a neighborhood of
θ8. As Proposition 1 in Morris et al. (2012) shows, strict rationalizability is a sufficient condition for robust
rationalizability. See also Kajii and Morris (2020) for related results.
30The intermediate case in which ai is rationalizable for player i given infinite data, but not strictly
rationalizable, is subtle and depends on details of the game. See Online Appendix O.4 for examples in which
limnÑ8rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs “ t1u and in which limnÑ8rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs “ r0, 1s. Note that the latter corresponds
to a maximally ambiguous outcome—no amount of data is decisive on whether or not the action should be
considered rationalizable.
31It is crucial that convergence occurs in this topology and not simply the product topology, as otherwise
the negative results of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) would apply.
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Bpznq-rationalizability, we need that ai is rationalizable for all types from TBpznqi when n
is sufficiently large. To establish this, I show that there is a P -measure 1 set of sequences
along which the sets
´
T
Bpznq
i
¯8
n“1
converge to the singleton set tt8i u in the Hausdorff metric
induced by the uniform-weak metric. The key lemma underlying this result, Lemma 6,
relates the degree of “strictness” of rationalizability of action ai at the limiting type t
8
i to
the size of the neighborhood around µ8 such that common certainty of that neighborhood
implies rationalizability of ai. The stronger property that types converge uniformly over the
set T
Bpznq
i delivers the desired result.
5 (Small) Finite Samples
The previous section characterized confidence sets given large numbers of common obser-
vations. I now focus on the setting of small n, and bound the extent to which the agent’s
confidence set rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs diverges from its asymptotic limit rp8paiq, p8paiqs. Through-
out this section, I impose the simplifying assumptions that observations are i.i.d., and that
they take values from a finite set Z:
Assumption 4. Z1, . . . , Zn „i.i.d. Q.
Assumption 5. |Z| ă 8.
In some cases, as in the examples in Section 2, the confidence set can be exactly charac-
terized. In what follows, I provide bounds for the confidence set that can be easier to derive
in certain cases.
5.1 Lower Bound
First consider an action ai that is strictly rationalizable for player i of type t
8
i . By Theorem
1, the analyst’s confidence set rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs converges to a degenerate interval at 1. Propo-
sition 5, below, provides a lower bound on pnpaiq, which informs how fast this convergence
occurs.
A key input into the bound is the “degree” to which ai is strictly rationalizable for the
limiting type t8i . Say that a family of sets pRirtisqtiPTi , where each Rjrtjs Ď Aj, has the
δ-strict best reply property if for each i P I, type ti P Ti, and action ai P Rirtis there is a
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conjecture σ´i : Θˆ T´i Ñ ∆pA´iq to which ai is a δ-strict best reply for ti; that is,ż
Θ
uipai, σ´ipθ, t´iq, θqtirdθ ˆ dt´is ´
ż
Θ
uipa1i, σ´ipθ, t´iq, θqtirdθ ˆ dt´is ě δ @a1i ‰ ai.
Say that an action ai is δ-strict rationalizable for type ti if there exists a family of sets
pRjrtjsqtjPTj with the δ-strict best reply property, where ai P Rirtis.32
Then, if ai is strictly rationalizable for the limiting type t
8
i , and players have commonly
observed n realizations, the probability that ai is rationalizable for all permitted types can
be upper bounded as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose ai is strictly rationalizable for type t
8
i , and define
δ8 :“ sup tδ : ai is δ-strictly rationalizable for type t8i u (4)
noting that this quantity is strictly positive. Further define
ξ :“ sup
θ,θ1PΘ
}θ ´ θ1}8. (5)
Then, for every n ě 1,
pnpaiq ě 1´ 2Kξ
δ8
E
ˆ
sup
µPM
dP pµpZnq, µ8q
˙
(6)
where K is the Lipschitz constant of the map g : Θ Ñ U .
Recalling that pnpaiq ě pnpaiq for every n, this proposition allows us to lower bound the
confidence set rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs.
The expression in (7) is increasing in δ8, so the “more strictly-rationalizable” the action
is for the limiting type, the fewer observations are necessary for the prediction to hold. The
bound is decreasing in EpsupµPM dP pµpZnq, µ8qq, which is the expected distance from the
limiting belief µ8 to the farthest belief in the plausible set BpZnq. When Assumption 3 is
satisfied, then EpsupµPM dP pµpZnq, µ8qq Ñ 0 as n Ñ 8, and the speed of this convergence
can be interpreted as the speed at which players commonly learn (Cripps et al., 2008).
Thus, Theorem 5 suggests that the quicker players commonly learn, the fewer observations
are necessary for limiting predictions to carry over to small-data settings.
In an important special case, the limiting belief µ8 is a point mass at some θ8, and the
32This is equivalent to γ-rationalizability from Dekel et al. (2007), where γ “ ´δ.
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sets Bpznq consist of beliefs with support on shrinking neighborhoods of θ8. Formally, let
C pznq :“
ď
µPM
suppµpznq @ zn P Zn
with the implication that every µpznq, µ P M, assigns probability 1 to C pznq. If C pznq
collapses to the singleton set tθ8u as n Ñ 8, then the bound in Proposition 5 can be
simplified as follows.
Assumption 6. supθPC pZnq }θ ´ θ8}8 converges to zero P -almost surely.33
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 6 holds, and the action ai is strictly rationalizable for
type t8i . Then, for every n ě 1,
pnpaiq ě 1´ 2K
δ8
E
˜
sup
θPC pZnq
}θ ´ θ8}8
¸
(7)
where K is the Lipschitz constant of the map g : Θ Ñ U .
The expressions in Propositions 5 and 2 can be used to derive quantitative bounds for
specific sets of learning rules, as in the following example:
Example 2. Consider the payoff matrix from Section 2.2 with unknown parameter β P
R. Suppose that players commonly observe n public signals zt “ β ` εt, with standard
normal error terms εt that are i.i.d. across observations. The set of learning rules is M “
tµxuxPr´η,ηs, where each learning rule µx is identified with the prior belief β „ N px, 1q, and
maps data into a point mass at the posterior expectation of β. The set C pznq thus consists
of the posterior expectations under the different priors, and players have common certainty
in the event that all players have first-order beliefs with support on C pznq. Let the true value
of β satisfy β ą 1. Then, applying Proposition 2:
Corollary 1. For each n ě 1,
pnpstrongq ě 1´ 1
β ´ 1
˜c
2
pin
` β ` η
n` 1
¸
The bound in Corollary 1 is decreasing in η (the size of the model class), increasing in n (the
number of observations), and increasing in β´ 1 (the strictness of the solution at the limit).
33That is, there is a P -measure 1 set of (infinite) sequences such that supθPC pznq }θ´ θ8}8 Ñ 0 as nÑ8
for each sequence z in this set.
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5.2 Upper Bound
Now suppose that the action ai is not rationalizable for player i of type t
8
i . We know from
Part (c) of Theorem 1 that in this case, the analyst’s confidence set rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs converges
to a degenerate interval at zero. But given small quantities of data n, the action ai may still
constitute a plausible prediction of play, as in the trading game studied in Section 2. Claim
3, below, provides an upper bound on pnpaiq, which informs whether the analyst should
consider ai a plausible prediction away from the limit.
To define this bound, a few intermediate definitions are needed. Let Zai be all data sets
zn given which the action ai is weaklyBpznq-rationalizable. (This set must be determined on
a case-by-case basis.) Let pQzn P ∆pZq be the empirical measure associated with data set zn.
The Kullback-Leibler divergence between pQzn and the actual data-generating distribution Q
is DKLp pQzn}Qq “ řzPZ Qpzq log ´ pQzn pzqQpzq ¯. Define
Q˚n “ argminpQPtznPZnaiu
DKLp pQzn}Qq
to be the empirical measure (associated with a data set in Zai) that is closest in Kullback-
Leibler divergence to Q. Application of Sanov’s theorem directly gives the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose ai is not rationalizable for type t
8
i ; then, for every n ě 1,
pnpaiq ď pn` 1q|Z|2´nDKLpQn˚}Qq.
Recalling that pnpaiq ě pnpaiq for every n, this proposition allows us to upper bound the
confidence set rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs. The claim is applied below in an example setting:
Example 3. Consider the trading game from Section 2 and the learning rules described in
Example 1, but suppose that the domain of q is r2{3, 1s and the domain of pi is r1{4, 3{4s,
so that Assumption 3 is satisfied. Let the true signal structure be identified with q˚ “ 3{4.
and suppose the posted price is p “ 3{4. Theorem 1 implies that entering will fail to be
rationalizable when players have observed sufficient data. Nevertheless, the action may be
rationalizable for a permitted belief if players have observed a small number of data points.
The corollary below quantifies this probability.
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Corollary 2. For each n ě 1,
pnpenterq ď pn` 1q22´rnn
where rn “ 34
´
logp3nq ´ log
´
tn
2
` logp9q
logp2qu
¯¯
` 1
4
´
logpnq ´ log
´
tn
2
´ logp9q
logp2qu
¯¯
.
6 Extensions
Asymptotic Disagreement. In the main text, I imposed an assumption which guaran-
teed that beliefs produced by learning rules inM uniformly converge to a common limiting
belief µ8. This implies that learning eventually removes all differences in beliefs. It is pos-
sible to replace Assumption 3 with the following, weaker condition, which allows players to
have heterogeneous beliefs even in the limit: For any  ě 0, say that the class of learning
rules M satisfies -Uniform Convergence if
lim
nÑ8 supµPM
dP pµpZnq, µ8q ď  P -a.s.
This requires that the set of expected parameters converges to an -neighborhood of µ8.
Then, Theorem 1 holds as long as the set of learning rulesM satisfies -Uniform Convergence
for some  ď δ8{p2Kξq. The rate results do not change.
Approximate Common Certainty. Suppose that instead of imposing common certainty
inBpznq, as we have done in the main text, players have common p-belief inBpznq. Formally,
for any probability p P r0, 1s, player i, and set B Ď ∆pΘq, define
B1,pi pBq :“ tti P T ˚i : margΘ κi˚ ptiq P Bu .34
For each k ą 1, and again for each player i, recursively define
Bk,pi pBq “
#
ti P T ˚i : κ˚i ptiq
˜
Θˆ
ź
j‰i
Bk´1,pj pBq
¸
ě p
+
.
34This set has the same definition as B1,1i from the main text. It is possible to relax the assumptions
further, so that B1,pi pBq :“ tti P Ti˚ : supνPB dP pν,margΘ κi˚ ptiqq ď 1´ pu, but this does not correspond to
any standard definitions.
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Then TB,pi “
Ş
kě1B
k,p
i pBq is the set of player i types that have common p-belief in the event
that all players’ first-order beliefs belong to B. There exists a p such that so long as players
have common p-belief in the event that all players’ first-order beliefs belong to Bpznq, where
p ą p, then Theorem 1 holds as stated. Rate results similar to those in Section 5 can also
be obtained (see Online Appendix O.5 for details). Both extensions rely on boundedness of
the payoff range.
Confidence Sets for Equilibrium. The proposed approach can be paired with solution
concepts besides rationalizability. For example, suppose we are interested in evaluating an
analyst’s confidence in predicting that the action profile a P A is part of a (pure-strategy)
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The analogous confidence set is rpnpaq, pnpaqs, where the lower
bound pnpaq is the probability (over possible datasets zn) that ai is a best reply to a´i for
every player i of any type ti P TBpznqi . The upper bound pn is the probability that there
exists a belief-closed type space pTi, κiqiPI where each Ti Ď TBpznqi , and the strategy profile
σ with σiptiq “ ai for all i, ti P Ti is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then, Theorem 1 holds
with “strict rationalizability” replaced with “strict equilibrium” in the limiting game, and
the rate results provided in Theorem 5 hold when δ8 is replaced with an analogous notion
for the strictness of the equilibrium in the limiting game.
7 Conclusion
Economists make predictions in incomplete information games based on models of unobserv-
able beliefs. A large literature on the robustness of strategic predictions to the specification
of agent beliefs provides guidance regarding whether these predictions should be trusted.
These robustness notions tend to be qualitative—we learn whether the prediction is or isn’t
robust to perturbations in the agents’ beliefs. Here I offer a different perspective, namely a
quantitative metric for how robust the prediction is. The metric depends on the quantity of
data that agents get to see. Predictions that hold given infinite quantities of data may not
hold given large quantities of data, and those that hold given large quantities of data may not
hold in environments where agents see only a few observations. Likewise, predictions that
don’t hold at the limit may nevertheless be plausible when agents’ beliefs are coordinated by
a small number of observations. The proposed framework provides a way of formalizing this,
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generating new comparative statics for how the analyst’s confidence in a strategic prediction
varies with primitives of the learning environment.
References
Acemoglu, D., V. Chernozhukov, and M. Yildiz (2015): “Fragility of Asymptotic
Agreement under Bayesian Learning,” Theoretical Economics, 11, 187–225.
Al-Najjar, N. (2009): “Decisionmakers as Statisticians: Diversity, Ambiguity, and Learn-
ing,” Econometrica, 77, 1371–1401.
Al-Najjar, N. and M. Pai (2014): “Coarse Decision Making and Overfitting,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 150, 467–486.
Aumann, R. J. (1976): “Agreeing to Disagree,” The Annals of Statistics, 4, 1236–1239.
Battigalli, P. and A. Prestipino (2011): “Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and
Forward Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information,” The B.E. Journal
of Theoretical Economics, 13, 79–130.
Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (2003): “Rationalization and Incomplete Informa-
tion,” Advances in Theoretical Economics, 3, 1534–5963.
Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel (1993): “Hierarchies of Belief and Common Knowl-
edge,” Journal of Economic Theory, 59, 189–198.
Brandenburger, A., A. Friedenberg, and J. Kiesler (2008): “Admissibility in
Games,” Econometrica, 76, 307–352.
Carlin, B. I., S. Kogan, and R. Lowery (2013): “Trading Complex Assets,” The
Journal of Finance, 68, 1937–1960.
Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993): “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,”
Econometrica, 61, 989–1018.
Chen, Y.-C., A. di Tillio, E. Faingold, and S. Xiong (2010): “Uniform topologies
on types,” Theoretical Economics, 5, 445–478.
——— (2017): “Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs,” Review of
Economic Studies, 84, 1424–1471.
Chen, Y.-C. and S. Takahashi (2020): “On Robust Selection and Robust Rationaliz-
ability,” Working Paper.
Cripps, M., J. Ely, G. Mailath, and L. Samuelson (2008): “Common Learning,”
28
Econometrica, 76, 909–933.
Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and D. Levine (2004): “Learning to Play Bayesian Games,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 282–303.
Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and S. Morris (2006): “Topologies on Types,” Theoretical
Economics, 1, 275–309.
——— (2007): “Interim Correlated Rationalizability,” Theoretical Economics, 2, 15–40.
Ely, J. and M. Peski (2011): “Critical Types,” Review of Economic Studies, 78, 907–937.
Esponda, I. (2013): “Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: A Framework for Robust
Predictions,” Theoretical Economics, 8, 467–501.
Gayer, G., I. Gilboa, and O. Lieberman (2007): “Rule-Based and Case-Based Rea-
soning in Housing Prices,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 7, 1–37.
Geanakoplos, J. and H. Polemarchakis (1982): “We Can’t Disagree Forever,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 28, 192–200.
Geary, R. C. (1935): “The Ratio of the Mean Deviation to the Standard Deviation as a
Test for Normality,” Biometrika, 27, 310–332.
Gibbs, A. and F. Su (2002): “On Choosing and Bounding Probability Metrics,” Interna-
tional Statistic Review.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (1995): “Case-Based Decision Theory,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 110, 605–639.
——— (2003): “Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach,” Econometrica, 71, 1–26.
Haghtalab, N., M. O. Jackson, and A. D. Procaccia (2020): “Belief Polarization
in a Complex World: A Learning Theory Perspective,” Working Paper.
Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman (2009): The Elements of Statistical Learn-
ing, Springer.
Jehiel, P. (2005): “Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium,” Journal of Economic The-
ory, 123, 81–104.
——— (2018): “Investment Strategy and Selection Bias: An Equilibrium Perspective on
Overoptimism,” American Economic Review, 108, 1582–1597.
Kajii, A. and S. Morris (1997): “The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Informa-
tion,” Econometrica, 65, 1283–1309.
——— (2020): “Refinements and Higher-Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey,” The Japanese
Economic Review, 71, 7–34.
29
Kandel, E. and N. Pearson (1995): “Differential Interpretation of Information and
Trade in Speculative Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 103, 831–872.
Mankiw, G., R. Reis, and J. Wolfers (2004): “Disagreement about inflation expecta-
tions,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003.
Mertens, J.-F. and S. Zamir (1985): “Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with
Incomplete Information,” International Journal of Game Theory, 14, 1–29.
Milgrom, P. and N. Stokey (1982): “Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 17–27.
Monderer, D. and D. Samet (1989): “Approximating Common Knowledge with Com-
mon Beliefs,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 170–190.
Morris, S. (1995): “The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory,” Economics and
Philosophy, 11, 227–253.
Morris, S., S. Takahashi, and O. Tercieux (2012): “Robust Rationalizability Under
Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs,” The Japanese Economic Review, 63, 57–67.
Olea, J. M., P. Ortoleva, M. Pai, and A. Prat (2017): “Competing Models,” Work-
ing Paper.
Ollar, M. and A. Penta (2017): “Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 107, 2243–2277.
Rubinstein, A. (1989): “The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under ”Almost
Common Knowledge”,” American Economic Review, 79, 385–391.
Salant, Y. and J. Cherry (2020): “Statistical Inference in Games,” Working Paper.
Spiegler, R. (2016): “Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 131, 1243–1290.
Steiner, J. and C. Stewart (2008): “Contagion through Learning,” Theoretical Eco-
nomics, 3, 431–458.
Weinstein, J. and M. Yildiz (2007): “A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with
Application to Robust Prediction of Refinements,” Econometrica, 75, 365–400.
——— (2017): “Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Infinite Games,” Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics, 72, 82–87.
30
Appendix
A Proofs for Section 2
A.1 Proof of Claim 1
Suppose that fpxSq “ 1, so that the Seller’s value good has a high value. (The proof follows along
similar lines in the other case.) I will first show that pn “ 0 for every n. Let pi be a point mass at f .
An agent with this prior assigns probability 1 to v “ 1 no matter the outcome of the data. Hence,
the degenerate distribution at 1 belongs to Bpznq for every zn, so common certainty in v “ 1 is
consistent with Assumption 1 with probability 1.35 But entering is not rationalizable for the Seller
with this belief, implying pn “ 0 as desired.
To prove Parts (a) and (b) of the claim, which refer to the probability pn, I first show that
entering is rationalizable for some type satisfying Assumption 1 if and only if there exist f˜ , f˜ 1 P F
that are consistent with the data, and which make conflicting predictions for the Seller’s good xS
(Lemma 1). I characterize the probability of this event in Lemma 3, from which the comparative
statics for pn follow directly.
Lemma 1. Fix an arbitrary data set zn “ tpxi, fpxiqquni“1. Entering is rationalizable for the Seller
with a belief satisfying Assumption 1 if and only if there exist f˜ , f˜ 1 P F where
(1) f˜pxiq “ f˜ 1pxiq “ fpxiq for each observation i “ 1, . . . , n
(2) f˜pxSq “ 1 while f˜ 1pxSq “ 0
Proof. Suppose there exists a pair f˜ , f˜ 1 satisfying (1) and (2), and define pif˜ , pif˜ 1 P ∆pFq to be
point masses on f˜ and f˜ 1. Since these rules are consistent with the data by (1), the posterior beliefs
updated to zn are likewise degenerate at f˜ and f˜
1, and thus assign (respectively) probability 1 to
v “ 1 and probability 1 to v “ 0. This implies that degenerate distributions at 1 and 0 both belong
to Bpznq. Entering is rationalizable for the Seller who believes that v “ 1 with probability 1, and
who believes with probability 1 that the Buyer believes v “ 0 with probability 1. This belief is
consistent with common certainty that all players have first-order beliefs in Bpznq.
Now suppose that no such pair f˜ , f˜ 1 exists, implying either that every f˜ P F consistent with the
data predicts fpxSq “ 0, or that every f˜ P F consistent with the data predicts fpxSq “ 1. Then
either Bpznq is the singleton set consisting of a degenerate distribution at 1, or it is the singleton
set consisting of a degenerate distribution at 0. If the former, the only type satisfying Assumption
1 is the one with common certainty in v “ 1, and if the latter, the only type satisfying Assumption
1 is the one with common certainty in v “ 0. Entering is not rationalizable for the Seller with
either of these beliefs.
35Here, and elsewhere in the proof, type ti has common certainty in v “ 1 if the type has common certainty
in the event tf | fpxSq “ 1u ˆ pX ˆ t0, 1uq8 ˆ T ˚´i.
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Lemma 2. Suppose the true function is fpxq “ 1px P Rq where R “ r´r1, r1s ˆ r´r2, r2s ˆ
. . . r´rm, rms for a sequence of constants r1, r1, . . . , rm, rm P p0, 1q. Then
pnpaiq “ 1´
mź
k“1
ˆ
1´
ˆ
1
2
˙n
rp2´ rkqn ` p2´ rkqn ´ p2´ prk ` rkqqns
˙
.
Proof. From Lemma 1, the probability pn is equal to the measure of data sets zn given which there
exist f˜ , f˜ 1 P F that are consistent with zn, and which make conflicting predictions at the input xS .
The true classification rule f is always consistent with the data, and predicts fpxSq “ 1, so a pair
of such rules exists if we can additionally find a rule f˜ P F consistent with the data that predicts
f˜pxSq “ 0.
A necessary and sufficient condition for existence of such a rule is that there is some dimension
k on which either every observation xi satisfies x
k
i ă 0, or every xi satisfies 0 ă xkj . This allows
some f˜ P F to be consistent with the data, but to predict 0 at the zero vector.
For each dimension k, the probability that there is at least one observation xi with x
k
i P r´rk, 0q
and at least one observation xj with x
k
j P p0, rks is
1´
ˆ
1
2
˙n
rp2´ rkqn ` p2´ rkqn ´ p2´ prk ` rkqqns.
Observe that attribute values are independent across dimensions. So the probability that for every
dimension k, there is at least one observation xki P r´rk, 0q and at least one observation xj with
xkj P p0, rks, is
mź
k“1
ˆ
1´
ˆ
1
2
˙n
rp2´ rkqn ` p2´ rkqn ´ p2´ prk ` rkqqns
˙
.
The desired probability is the complement of this event, which yields the expression in the lemma.
The following functional form is used in the main text:
Corollary 3. In the special case in which the true function is fpxq “ 1px P Rq where R “ r´a, asm
for some a P p0, 1q, then pnpaiq “ 1´
“
1´ `2 `2´a2 ˘n ´ p1´ aqn˘‰m .
A.2 Proof of Claim 2
I first demonstrate the following lemma, which characterizes the probabilities pn and pn.
Lemma 3. For every n ě 1,
pn “ 1´ Φ
˜
zα ´ β ´ 1
σ
c
n2 ´ 1
12
¸
while
pn “ 1´ Φ
˜
´zα ´ β ´ 1
σ
c
n2 ´ 1
12
¸
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where zα “ ´Φ´1pα{2q with Φ denoting the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
Since β ą 1 by assumption, both expressions are decreasing in σ and increasing in n. Thus Claim
2 follows.
Towards this lemma, I first prove the following intermediate result:
Lemma 4. Write TCi for the set of player i types with common certainty in the event that all
players have first-order beliefs that assign probability 1 to C .
(a) The strong policy is rationalizable for all types ti P TCi if and only if C Ď r1,8q.
(b) The strong policy is rationalizable for some type ti P TCi if and only if C X r1,8q ‰ H.
Proof. (a) C Ď r1,8q is a necessary condition, as otherwise the strong policy is not rationalizable
for any type with common certainty in β1 P C zr1,8q. Suppose C Ď r1,8q and choose any ti P TCi .
For each β P C , uipstrong, strong, βq “ ´1 while uipweak, strong, βq “ ´β ď ´1. Soż
uipstrong, strong, βqt1i pβqdβ “ ´1 ě
ż
uipweak, strong, βqt1i pβqdβ
where t1i denotes the first-order belief of type ti. Thus the family of sets pR1, R2q with R1 “ R2 “
tstrongu are closed under best reply, and rationalizability of the strong policy follows.
(b) Suppose C X r1,8q “ H. Then for every β P C ,
uipstrong, strong, βq “ ´1 ď ´β “ uipweak, strong, βq.
So the strong policy is strictly dominated (and hence not rationalizable) for player i given any type
ti P TCi . If instead C X r1,8q ‰ H, then the strong policy is rationalizable for any type with
common certainty in some β in this intersection. So the strong policy is rationalizable for at least
one type ti P TCi , as desired.
I now prove Lemma 3.
Proof. Using standard results for ordinary least-squares (Hastie et al., 2009), the distribution of
the OLS estimator βˆ is
βˆ „ N
˜
β,
σ2
1
n
řn
t“1pt´ tq2
¸
where t “ 1n
řn
t“1 t. Since
1
n
nÿ
t“1
pt´ tq2 “ 1
n
˜
nÿ
t“1
t2 ´ 2t
nÿ
t“1
t`
nÿ
t“1
t
2
¸
“ pn` 1qp2n` 1q
6
´ pn` 1q
2
2
`
ˆ
n` 1
2
˙2
“ pn
2 ´ 1q
12
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we can simplify the variance of βˆ to 12σ
2
n2´1 . The p1 ´ αq-confidence interval for β given data zn is
thus
C pznq “
«
βˆpznq ´ zα ¨ σ ¨
c
12
n2 ´ 1 , βˆpznq ` zα ¨ σ ¨
c
12
n2 ´ 1
ff
(8)
where βpznq is the OLS estimate of β given the data zn, and zα “ ´Φ´1pα{2q is the critical value
associated with the p1 ´ αq-confidence level. The probability that the interval in (8) is contained
in r1,8q is
Pr
˜
βˆpznq ą 1` zα ¨ σ ¨
c
12
n2 ´ 1
¸
.
which is in turn equal to
1´ Φ
˜
1.96´ β ´ 1
σ
c
n2 ´ 1
12
¸
. (9)
By Part (a) of Lemma 4, pn is equal to (9), delivering the first part of the lemma.
The probability that the interval in (8) has nonempty intersection with r1,8q is given by
Pr
˜
βˆpznq ą 1´ zα ¨ σ ¨
c
12
n2 ´ 1
¸
which is equal to
1´ Φ
˜
´zα ´ β ´ 1
σ
c
n2 ´ 1
12
¸
(10)
By Part (b) of Lemma 4, pn is equal to (10), concluding the proof.
B Proofs for Main Results (Sections 4 and 5)
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1 Part (a)
Recall that Θ and U are both endowed with the sup-norm, and the map g : Θ Ñ U has Lipschitz
constant K. The set of probability measures ∆pΘq is endowed with the Prokhorov metric dP . The
Wasserstein distance on ∆pΘq is
dW pν, ν1q “ sup
"ż
hdν ´
ż
hdν 1 : }h}L ď 1
*
where }h}L is the Lipschitz constant of the function h : Θ Ñ R.
Lemma 5. Fix any player i, action ai P Ai, mixed strategy αi P ∆pAiq, and set R´i Ď A´i. Let
a´ipθq : Θ Ñ ∆pA´iq be any function satisfying
a´ipθq P argmax
a´iPR´i
puipai, a´i, θq ´ uipαi, a´i, θqq @θ P Θ
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and define h : Θ Ñ R by
hpθq “ uipai, a´ipθq, θq ´ uipαi, a´ipθq, θq.
Then, the function h is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 2K.
Proof. Choose any θ, θ1 P Θ, and without loss of generality, suppose hpθq ě hpθ1q. Then
|hpθq ´ hpθ1q| “ |pupai, a´ipθq, θq ´ upαi, a´ipθq, θqq´
pupai, a´ipθ1q, θ1q ´ upαi, a´ipθ1q, θ1qq|
ď |pupai, a´ipθq, θq ´ upαi, a´ipθq, θqq´
pupai, a´ipθq, θ1q ´ upαi, a´ipθq, θ1qq|
ď |upai, a´ipθq, θq ´ upai, a´ipθq, θ1q|`
|upαi, a´ipθq, θq ´ upαi, a´ipθq, θ1q|
ď 2}gpθq ´ gpθ1q}8 ď 2K}θ ´ θ1}8
using in the final inequality that g : Θ Ñ U has Lipschitz constant K.
Below, let F  denote the -neighborhood of the set F .
Lemma 6. Suppose ai is δ-strictly rationalizable for player i of type t
8
i , where δ ą 0. Let B be
any subset of tµ8uδ{p2Kξq, where K is the Lipschitz constant of g : Θ Ñ U , and ξ is as defined in
(5). Then, ai is rationalizable for all types ti P TBi .36
Proof. Fix  ą 0, and consider an arbitrary set B Ď tµ8u. I will show that ai is rationalizable for
all types ti P TBi when  is sufficiently small.
To show this, I use Proposition 1 from Chen et al. (2010):37
Proposition 4 (Chen et al. (2010)). For each k ě 1, player i P I, type ti P Ti, and action
ai P Ai, we have ai P Ski rtis if and only if for each αi P ∆pAiztaiuq, there exists a measurable
σ´i : Θˆ T´i Ñ ∆pA´iq with
suppσ´ipθ, t´iq Ď Sk´1´i rt´is @pθ, t´iq P Θˆ T´i
such that ż
ΘˆT´i
ruipai, σ´ipθ, t´iq, θq ´ uipαi, σ´ipθ, t´iq, θstirdθ ˆ dt´is ě 0
By assumption, there is a δ P R`` such that ai is δ-strictly rationalizable for player i of type
t8i . This implies that there exists a family of sets pRjqjPI Ď
ś
jPI Aj , where ai P Ri, and for every
36Chen et al. (2010) demonstrate a similar result for finite state spaces Θ (see their Proposition 2). I use
ideas from their proof here, but consider a more general environment, replacing finiteness of Θ with Lipschitz
continuity on g : Θ Ñ U .
37Proposition 1 from Chen et al. (2010) characterizes γ-rationalizability for arbitrary γ P R. For the
purposes of this proof, it is sufficient to set γ “ 0.
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aj P Rj there exists a σ8´j : Θ Ñ ∆pA´jq satisfying
suppσ8´jpθq Ď R´j @θ P Θ
and ż
Θ
ujpaj , σ8´jpθq, θqdµ8 ´
ż
Θ
ujpa1j , σ8´jpθq, θqdµ8 ě δ @a1j ‰ aj (11)
I will show that for each k ě 1, player j, type tj P TBj , action aj P Rj , and mixed strategy
αj P ∆pAjztajuq, there exists a measurable σ´j : Θˆ TB´j Ñ ∆pA´jq with
suppσ´jpθ, t´jq Ď R´j @pθ, t´jq P Θˆ TB´j
and ż
ΘˆTB´j
rujpaj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θq ´ ujpαj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θstjrdθ ˆ dt´js ě 0. (12)
Since ai P Ri by design, it follows from Proposition 4 that for any type ti P TBi , the action ai P Ski rtis
for every k, and hence ai P S8i rtis, as desired.
Fix an arbitrary player j, aj P Rj , type tj P TBj , and αj P ∆pAjztajuq. Define a´j : Θ Ñ A´j
to satisfy
a´jpθq P argmax
a´jPR´j
pujpaj , a´j , θq ´ ujpαj , a´j , θqq @θ P Θ
and define σ´j : Θ ˆ TB´j Ñ ∆pA´jq so that each σ´jpθ, t´jq is a point mass at a´ipθq. Then by
definition
suppσ´jpθ, t´jq Ď R´j @pθ, t´jq P Θˆ TB´j .
Further define
hpθq :“ ujpaj , a´jpθq, θq ´ ujpαj , a´jpθq, θq @θ P Θ.
For notational ease, write ν P ∆pΘq for the first-order belief of type tj . Thenż
ΘˆTB´j
ujpaj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js ´
ż
ΘˆTB´j
ujpαj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js
“
ż
Θ
ujpaj , a´jpθq, θqνrdθs ´
ż
Θ
ujpαj , a´jpθq, θqνrdθs “
ż
Θ
hpθqνrdθs
so the desired condition in (12) follows if we can show that
ş
Θ hpθqνrdθs ě 0.
By Lemma 5, the function h : Θ Ñ R has Lipschitz constant 2K, soˇˇˇˇż
Θ
hpθqdν ´
ż
Θ
hpθqdµ8
ˇˇˇˇ
ď 2K ¨ dW pν, µ8q
where dW is the Wasserstein distance on ∆pΘq. This impliesż
Θ
hpθqdν ě
ż
Θ
hpθqdµ8 ´ 2K ¨ dW pν, µ8q.
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Applying Theorem 2 in Gibbs and Su (2002), dW pν, µ8q ď ξ ¨dP pν, µ8q, where dP is the Prokhorov
distance on ∆pΘq and ξ is as defined in (5). Soż
Θ
hpθqdν ě
ż
Θ
hpθqdµ8 ´ 2Kξ ¨ dP pν, µ8q (13)
It follows from the inequality in (11) thatż
Θ
hpθqdµ8 “
ż
Θ
ujpaj , σ8´jpθq, θqdµ8 ´
ż
Θ
ujpαj , σ8´jpθq, θqdµ8 ě δ,
so (13) implies ż
Θ
hpθqdν ě δ ´ 2Kξ ¨ dP pν, µ8q.
Finally, by assumption that tj P TBj for some B Ď tµ8u, the Prokhorov distance between the
first-order belief of type tj and the limiting belief ν
8 is dP pν, µ8q ď . Soż
Θ
hpθqdν ě δ ´ 2Kξ.
It follows that  ď δ{p2Kξq is a sufficient condition for the constructed σ´j to satisfy the desired
condition in (12).
Since ai is strictly rationalizable for type t
8
i (by assumption), there exists a δ P R`` for which
ai is δ-strictly rationalizable. Assumption 3 implies that
lim
nÑ8P
n
˜#
zn | sup
µPM
dP pµpznq, µ8q ď 
+¸
“ 0 @ ą 0.
which further implies
lim
nÑ8P
n
´!
zn | Bpznq Ď tθ8uδ{2Kξ
)¯
“ 0 (14)
By Lemma 6,
pnpaiq ě Pn
´!
zn | Bpznq Ď tθ8uδ{2Kξ
)¯
@n ě 1
so from (14) we can directly conclude that pnpaiq Ñ 1. Theorem 1 Part (a) follows.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1 Part (b)
I begin by reviewing definitions from Chen et al. (2010) that will be used in the proof. For each
player i, let X0i “ Θ, and recursively for k ě 1, define Xki “ Θ ˆ
ś
j‰i ∆pXk´1j q.38 The space of
k-th order beliefs for player i is defined T ki :“ ∆pXk´1i q, noting that each T ki “ ∆pΘˆ T k´1´i q. The
38The sets Xk defined in Section 3.1 can be identified with the sets Xk defined in this way.
37
uniform-weak metric on the universal type space Ti˚ is
dUWi psi, tiq “ sup
kě1
dki psi, tiq @si, ti P Ti˚
where d0 is the supremum norm on Θ and recursively for k ě 1, dki is the Prokhorov distance on
∆pΘˆ T k´1´i q induced by the metric maxtd0, dk´1´i u on Θˆ T k´1´i .39 The uniform-weak topology on
the universal type space is the metric topology induced by dUWi .
Lemma 7. Let B be a subset of tµ8u, and choose any si P TBi . Then, dUWi pt8i , siq ď .
Proof. For simplicity of notation, write ti for t
8
i . It will be useful to define
TB,ki “
!
ski P T ki | si P TBi
)
for the set of all k-th order beliefs that are consistent with some type si P TBi .40 I will show that
dP
´
TB,ki , t
k
i
¯
:“ sup
ski PTB,ki
dP pski , tki q ď  @k ě 1 (15)
from which the desired lemma directly follows.
By construction, TB,1i “ B, so the assumption B Ď tµ8u immediately implies (15) for k “ 1.
Proceed by induction. Suppose dP
´
TB,ki , t
k
i
¯
ď , and consider any measurable set E Ď T k. If
tki P E, then tk`1i pEq “ 1 by definition of ti. Also,
sk`1i pEq ě sk`1i
´
ttki u
¯
ě sk`1i pTB,ki q “ 1
where the second inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis, and the final inequality follows
by assumption that si P TBi . So
tk`1i pEq ď sk`1i pEq ` . (16)
If tki R E, then tk`1i pEq “ 0 (again by definition of ti), so (16) follows trivially. Thus
dk`1i pti, siq “ inftδ | tk`1i pEq ď sk`1i pEδq ` δ @ measurable E Ď T ki u ď 
and so dUWi pti, siq “ supkě1 dki pti, siq ď  as desired.
Lemma 7 implies the subsequent corollary.
Corollary 4. Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Consider any sequence z P Z8 satisfying
lim
nÑ8 supµPM
dP pµpznq, µ8qq “ 0 (17)
39This definition is slightly modified from Chen et al. (2010), where d0 was the discrete metric on Θ. The
change reflects the difference that Θ was taken to be a finite set in Chen et al. (2010), while it is a compact
and convex subset of Euclidean space here.
40Here and elsewhere, tki denotes the k ´ th order belief of type ti.
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and choose any sequence of types psni q8n“1 with sni P TBpznqi for each n ě 1. Then
lim
nÑ8 d
UW
i pt8i , sni q “ 0.
Now we will complete the proof of Theorem 1 Part (b). By Assumption 3, there is a set
Z˚ Ď Z8 of P -measure 1 such that
lim
nÑ8 supµPM
dP pµpznq, µ8q “ 0 @z P Z˚ (18)
Suppose towards contradiction that pnpaiq9 0. Then, there is a set pZ Ď Z8 with strictly positive
P -measure such that for every z P pZ, there is a sequence of types ptni pzqq8n“1 where tni pzq P TBpznqi
for every n ě 1, and ai P S8i rtni pzqs for all n sufficiently large.
But since Z˚ has P -measure 1, it must be that pZXZ˚ ‰ H. Choose any z from this intersection.
Then, Lemma 4 and the display in (18) imply that tni pzq Ñ t8i in the uniform-weak topology. But
rationalizability is upper hemi-continuous in the uniform-weak topology (Theorem 1, Chen et al.
(2010)). So ai R S8i rt8i s implies ai R S8i rtni pzqs for infinitely many n, a contradiction.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 5
By assumption, ai is strictly rationalizable for type t
8
i , so δ
8 ą 0. Applying Lemma 6,
pnpaiq ě Pnptzn : Bpznq Ď tµ8uδ8{p2Kξquq
“ Pn
˜#
zn : sup
µPM
dP pµpznq, µ8q ď δ8{p2Kξqu
+¸
ě 1´ 2Kξ
δ8 E
˜
sup
µPM
dP pµpZnq, µ8q
¸
using Markov’s inequality in the final line.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose ai is strictly rationalizable for player i in the complete information game θ
8, and let δ8
be as defined in (4). Then, there exists a family of sets pRjqjPI with ai P Ri, where for each player
j and action aj P Rj , there is a mixed strategy σ´j P ∆pA´jq satisfying σ´jrR´js “ 1, and
uipai, σ´j , θ8q ´ uipa1i, σ´j , θ8q ě δ @a1i ‰ ai.
Now consider an arbitrary set C Ď tθ8u and a type ti with common certainty in the event
that every player’s first-order belief assigns probability 1 to C . Write ν P ∆pΘq for the first-order
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belief of type ti. For any action a
1
j ‰ aj ,ż
ujpaj , σ´j , θqdν ´
ż
ujpa1j , σj , θqdν “
ż
ujpaj , σ´j , θqdν ´
ż
ujpaj , σ´j , θqdµ8
`
ż
ujpaj , σ´j , θqdµ8 ´
ż
ujpa1j , σ´j , θqdµ8
`
ż
ujpa1j , σ´j , θqdµ8 ´
ż
ujpa1j , σj , θqdν
ě
ż
ujpaj , σ´j , θqdµ8 ´
ż
ujpa1j , σ´j , θqdµ8
´
ˇˇˇˇż
ujpaj , σ´j , θqdν ´
ż
ujpaj , σ´j , θqdµ8
ˇˇˇˇ
´
ˇˇˇˇż
ujpa1j , σ´j , θqdν ´
ż
ujpa1j , σj , θqdµ8
ˇˇˇˇ
ě δ ´ 2K ¨ dP pν, µ8q ě δ ´ 2K
using in the penultimate inequality that g : Θ Ñ U has Lipschitz constant K. Since this bound
on the payoff difference holds across all actions a1j ‰ aj , the action aj is a best reply to belief ν
whenever  ď δ{p2Kq.
This allows us to construct the lower bound
pnpaiq ě Qn
´!
zn : C pznq Ď tθ8uδ8{p2Kq
)¯
“ Qn
˜#
zn : sup
θPC pznq
}θ ´ θ8}8 ď δ8{p2Kq
+¸
ě 1´ 2K
δ8 E
˜
sup
θPC pznq
}θ ´ θ8}8
¸
using Markov’s inequality in the final line.
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O For Online Publication
O.1 Proof of Claim 3
Fix an arbitrary ppi, qq P p0, 1q ˆ p1{2, 1q. Given data zn, the posterior belief µpi,qpznq assigns
probability
vˆppi, q, znq :“ 1{
˜
1` 1´ pi
pi
ˆ
1´ q
q
˙np2zn´1q¸
(19)
to v “ 1, where zn “ 1n
řn
n1“1 zn1 denotes the average realization in the sequence zn.
Suppose without loss that v “ 1, and let q˚ P p1{2, 1q be the true frequency of z “ 1. By the
strong Law of Large numbers, there is a measure 1 set of sequences Z˚ satisfying limnÑ8p 1n
řn
n1“1 zn1q “
q˚ for every z “ pz1, z2, . . . q P Z˚. The expression in (19) converges to 1 on this set for every
ppi, qq P p0, 1qˆ p1{2, 1q. So Assumption 2 is satisfied, and the limiting belief µ8 assigns probability
1 to v “ 1. Since entering is not rationalizable for the Seller given common certainty in the event
in that all players assign probability 1 to v “ 1, it follows that pp8q “ pp8q “ 0.
I show next that the probability ppnq converges to 1 as nÑ8. Fix an arbitrary n, and define
Z:n “ tzn | zn ą 1{2u to be the set of length-n sequences with majority realizations of z “ 1. For
every zn P Z:n, the expression pp1 ´ qq{qqnp2zn´1q is bounded between 1/2 and 1 on the domain
q P p1{2, 1q, while the image of p1 ´ piq{pi is all of R`. Thus, the display in (19) ranges from zero
to 1; that is,
tvˆppi, q, znq : pi P p0, 1q, q P p1{2, 1qu “ p0, 1q @zn P Z:n.
It follows that for every zn P Z:n, there exist pairs ppi, qq, ppi1, q1q P p0, 1q ˆ p1{2, 1q satisfying
vˆppi, q, znq ă p ă vˆppi1, q1, znq. Entering is rationalizable for the Seller with a type that assigns
probability vˆppi1, q1, znq to the high value, and which assigns probability 1 to the Buyer assign-
ing probability vˆppi, q, znq to the high value. So entering is weakly Bpznq-rationalizable for every
zn P Z:n, implying pnpaiq ě PnpZ:nq.
Again by the law of large numbers, the measure of datasets with majority realizations of z “ 1
converges to 1 as nÑ8; that is, Pn
´
Z:n
¯
Ñ 1. So limnÑ8 pnpaiq “ 1, as desired.
O.2 Proof of Corollary 1
First observe that δ8 “ β´1, since the action Strong is δ-strictly rationalizable for every δ ă β´1
and not for any δ ě β ´ 1. It remains to determine E
”
supθ1PC pZnq }θ1 ´ θ8}8
ı
. Write Zn for the
(random) empirical mean of n signal realizations, and βˆxpznq for the expectation of β given signals
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zn and prior β „ N px, 1q. Then, using standard formulas for updating to Gaussian signals:
E
˜
sup
xPr´η,ηs
|β ´ βˆxpZnq|
¸
“ E
„
max
xPr´η,ηs
ˆˇˇˇˇ
β ´ x` nZn
n` 1
ˇˇˇˇ˙
We can further bound the RHS as follows:
E
„
max
xPr´η,ηs
ˆˇˇˇˇ
β ´ x` nZn
n` 1
ˇˇˇˇ˙
ď E
ˆˇˇˇˇ
β ´ nZn
n` 1
ˇˇˇˇ˙
` max
xPr´η,ηs
ˇˇˇˇ
x
n` 1
ˇˇˇˇ
“ E
ˆˇˇˇˇ
β ´ nZn
n` 1
ˇˇˇˇ˙
` η{pn` 1q
ď E `ˇˇβ ´ Zn ˇˇ˘` Eˆ Zn
n` 1
˙
` η{pn` 1q
“
c
2
npi
` β ` η
n` 1
using in the final line the expected absolute deviation of the empirical mean of n observations from
a Gaussian distribution (Geary, 1935). Finally, the map g : Θ Ñ U has Lipschitz constant 1.
Applying Proposition 2, we have the desired bound.
O.3 Proof of Corollary 2
Fix arbitrary pi, pi, q, q satisfying 0 ă pi ă pi ă 1 and 1{2 ă q ă q ă 1, and let M be the
set of learning rules identified with ppi, qq P rpi, pis ˆ rq, qs. Entering is rationalizable for a Seller
with common certainty that all players have first-order beliefs in Bpznq if and only if there exist
pi, pi1 P rpi, pis and q, q1 P rq, qs satisfying
vˆppi, q, znq ă p ă vˆppi1, q1, znq. (20)
where vˆppi, q, znq is as defined in (19). Let Zn˚ denote the set of all sequences zn satisfying (20).
Since the state space is binary, each empirical measure pQpznq P ∆pt0, 1uq can be identified with
its average realization zn, which is also the probability assigned to z “ 1. The KL-divergence
between pQpznq and the actual signal-generating distribution Q “ pq˚, 1´ q˚q is
DKLp pQpznq | Qq “ q˚ logˆ q˚
zn
˙
` p1´ q˚q log
ˆ
1´ q˚
1´ zn
˙
and this expression is monotonically increasing in |zn ´ q˚|. Thus, to minimize the KL-divergence,
we seek the value of zn closest to q
˚ for which (20) is satisfied.
Suppose zn ą 1{2. By assumption, pi ą p and q ą 1{2, so vˆppi, q, znq ą p. It remains
to determine when vˆppi, q, znq ă p is satisfied for some other ppi, qq P M. Since vˆppi, q, znq is
42
monotonically increasing in both pi and q for sequences zn satisfying zn ą 1{2 (and on the given
domain for (pi, q)), a necessary and sufficient condition is vˆppi, q, znq ă p. Using (19), this inequality
requires
1{
˜
1` 1´ pi
pi
ˆ
1´ q
q
˙np2zn´1q¸
ă p
which can be rewritten
zn ď 1
2
ˆ
1` 1
n
logp1´qq{q
ˆ
pi
1´ pi ¨
1´ p
p
˙˙
:“ zn˚.
Since zn˚ ¨ n need not be an integer, the distribution pzn˚, 1 ´ zn˚q may not be achievable by any
empirical measure pQn for finite n. Thus, Qn˚ is instead given by ptzn˚ ¨ nu{n, 1´ ptzn˚ ¨ nu{nq, and
DKLpQn˚}Qq “ q˚ log
ˆ
q˚
tzn˚ ¨ nu{n
˙
` p1´ q˚q log
ˆ
1´ q˚
1´ tzn˚ ¨ nu{n
˙
Plugging in the given parameter values, and applying Proposition 3, yields the expression in the
corollary.
O.4 Examples Related to Theorem 1
Part (a) of Theorem 1 provides a sufficient condition for the confidence set rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs to
converge to certainty—ai is strictly rationalizable for type t
8
i —and Part (b) of Theorem 1 provides a
necessary condition—ai is rationalizable for type t
8
i . The condition that ai is strictly rationalizable
is not necessary, as I demonstrate in Section O.4.1, and the condition that ai is rationalizable is
not sufficient, as I demonstrate in Section O.4.2.
In each of these examples, I assume (as in Section 5.1) that the limiting belief µ8 is degenerate
at a limiting parameter θ8, and players have common certainty of shrinking neighborhoods of this
parameter. That is, for every realization zn, players have common certainty in the event that players
have first-order beliefs with support on C pznq, where the support sets C pznq satisfy Assumption 6.
O.4.1 Strict Rationalizability is Not Necessary
Consider the following complete information game
a3 a4
a1 θ, 0 θ, 0
a2 0, 0 0, 0
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and suppose that the limiting belief is degenerate at θ8 “ 1. Then, the action a1 is strictly dominant
for player 1 in the limiting complete information game, and also for all types with common certainty
in the event that players have first-order beliefs with support on a small enough neighborhood of θ8.
So Assumption 3 implies limnÑ8rpnpaiq, pnpaiqs “ t1u. But action a1 is not strictly rationalizable
for type t8i .
O.4.2 Rationalizability is not Sufficient
I show next that rationalizability of ai for type t
8
i is not sufficient for the analyst’s confidence
set for ai to converge to certainty. Section O.4.3 provides a simple example to this effect. Define
Θai to be the set of parameter values θ such that ai is rationalizable for player i in the complete
information game indexed to θ. If ai is on the boundary of Θ
ai , then common certainty of shrinking
neighborhoods around θ8 does not guarantee rationalizability of ai. More surprisingly, common
certainty in arbitrarily small open sets within the interior of Θai also does not guarantee rational-
izability of ai, and I provide an example of this in Section O.4.4. (See also the working paper of
Chen and Takahashi (2020) for a nice two-player example to this effect.)
O.4.3 θ8 is on the Boundary of Θai
Consider the following two-player game, parametrized by θ P rθ, θs for some θ ă 0 ă θ:
a b
a θ, θ 0, 0
b 0, 0 1, 1
Suppose that the limiting parameter θ8 “ 0, so that a is rationalizable in the limiting complete
information game, but not strictly rationalizable. It is straightforward to see that common certainty
of shrinking neighborhoods of θ8 does not guarantee rationalizability of action a, as the type with
common certainty of any θ1 ă 0 considers a to be strictly dominated.
O.4.4 θ8 is in the Interior of Θai
But even if θ8 is not on the boundary of the set Θai , it may be that common certainty of a shrinking
neighborhood of θ8 does not guarantee rationalizability of ai. Consider the following four-player
game. Players 1 and 2 choose between actions in ta, bu, and player 3 chooses between matrices
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from tl, ru. Their payoffs are:
a b
a 1, 1, 0 0, 0, 0
b 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
a b
a 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
b 0, 0, 0 1, 1, 0
(21)
plq prq
A fourth player predicts whether players 1 and 2 chose matching actions or mis-matching actions.
He receives a payoff of 1 if he predicts correctly (and 0 otherwise).41 Player 4’s action does not
affect the payoffs of the other three players.
Let the state space Θ “ R64 be the set of all payoff matrices given these actions, where the
payoffs described above are a particular θ. Match is clearly rationalizable for player 4 at θ; it is
also rationalizable for player 4 on a neighborhood of θ (in the Euclidean metric).42
Nevertheless, I will show existence of a sequence of types for player 4 with common certainty
in increasingly small neighborhoods of θ, given which Match fails to be rationalizable. Along
this sequence, player 4 believes that a is uniquely rationalizable for player 1, while b is uniquely
rationalizable for player 2, so the action Match is strictly dominated.
Define θ1ε to be the following perturbation of the payoff matrix θ (with player 4’s payoffs
unchanged):
a b
a 1, 1, 0 0, 0, 0
b 0, 0, 0 ´ε, 0, 0
a b
a 0, 0,´ε 0, 0,´ε
b 0, 0,´ε 1, 1,´ε
(22)
plq prq
Let θ2ε correspond to the following payoff matrix (again with player 4’s payoffs unchanged):
a b
a 1, 1,´ε 0, 0,´ε
b 0, 0,´ε 0, 0,´ε
a b
a ´ε, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
b 0, 0, 0 1, 1, 0
(23)
plq prq
41In more detail: player 4 chooses between tMatch, Mismatchu. His payoff from Match is 1 if players 1
and 2 choose the same action (both a or both b) and 0 otherwise; his payoff from Mismatch is 1 if players 1
and 2 chose different actions (a and b or flipped), and 0 otherwise.
42Suppose neither l nor r are strictly dominated for player 1; then, all actions are rationalizable for player
1-3, so Match is rationalizable for player 4. If either l or r is strictly dominated for player 1, then one
of the following will be a rationalizable family: tlu ˆ tau ˆ tau ˆ tMatchu, tlu ˆ ta, bu ˆ ta, bu ˆ tMatchu,
tru ˆ tbu ˆ tbu ˆ tMatchu, or tru ˆ ta, bu ˆ ta, bu ˆ tMatchu. Thus, Match is rationalizable for player 4.
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Let ε ą 0. If player 1 has common certainty in the state θ1ε , then a is his uniquely rationalizable
action: l strictly dominates r for player 3, given which a strictly dominates b for player 1. By a
similar argument, if player 2 has common certainty in the state θ2ε , then b is his uniquely rational-
izable action. These statements hold for ε arbitrarily small. Construct a sequence of types ptεn4 q
for player 4, where each type tεn4 has common certainty that player 1 has common certainty in
the state θ1εn and player 2 has common certainty in the state θ
2
εn . Then, player 4 of type t
εn
4 has
common certainty in an ε-neighborhood of θ, but only one rationalizable action: Mismatch. Take
εn Ñ 0 (with each εn ą 0) and the desired conclusion obtain: rationalizability of Match holds at
limnÑ8 εn but fails to hold arbitrarily far out along the sequence εn.
O.5 Extension to Common p-Belief
For each q P r0, 1s, define:
pn,qpaiq “ Pn
´!
zn : ai P S8i rtis @ti P TB,qi
)¯
.
where q “ 1 returns the definition of pnpaiq given in the main text.
Proposition 5. Suppose ai is strictly rationalizable for type t
8
i , and define
δ8 :“ sup tδ : ai is δ-strictly rationalizable for type t8i u
noting that this quantity is strictly positive. Define
M :“ sup
a,a1PA,θ,θ1PΘ,jPI
|ujpa, θq ´ ujpa1, θ1q|. (24)
Then, for every n ě 1, and q ąM{pδ8 `Mq,
pn,qpaiq ě 1´ 2Mξq
δ8q ´ p1´ qqM E
˜
sup
µPM
dP pµpZnq, µ8q
¸
Proof. I first demonstrate a lemma analogous to Lemma 6.
Lemma 8. Suppose ai is δ
8-strictly rationalizable for player i of type t8i . Let B Ď ∆pΘq by any
set satisfying
sup
νPB
dP pν, µ8q ď δ
8q ´ p1´ qqM
2Mξq
where M is as defined in (24) and ξ is as defined in (5). Then, ai is rationalizable for all types
ti P TB,qi .
Proof. The proof follows along similar lines to the proof of Lemma 6. Fix  ą 0, and consider an
arbitrary set B Ď tµ8u. I will show that ai is rationalizable for all types ti P TB,qi when  is
sufficiently small and q is sufficiently large.
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By assumption, action ai is δ
8-strictly rationalizable for player i of type t8i . This implies that
there exists a family of sets pRjqjPI ĎśjPI Aj , where ai P Ri, and for every aj P Rj there exists a
σ8´j : Θ Ñ ∆pA´jq satisfying
suppσ8´jpθq Ď R´j @θ P Θ
and ż
Θ
ujpaj , σ8´jpθq, θqdµ8 ´
ż
Θ
ujpa1j , σ8´jpθq, θqdµ8 ě δ8 @a1j ‰ aj (25)
Partition the set of types TB,qj into those types whose first-order beliefs belong to B
T 1j :“
!
tj P TB,qj | t1j P B
)
@j P I
and all remaining types T
1
j :“ TB,qj zT 1j . By construction, every type in TB,qj assigns probability at
least q to T 1´j . I will now show that there exists a family of sets pVjrtjsqjPI,tjPTB,qj with the property
that for each k ě 1, player j, type tj P TB,qj , action aj P Rj , and mixed strategy αj P ∆pAjztajuq,
there exists a measurable σ´j : Θˆ TB,q´j Ñ ∆pA´jq with
(1) suppσ´jpθ, t´jq Ď V´jrt´js @pθ, t´jq P Θˆ TB,q´j
(2)
ş
ΘˆTB,q´j rujpaj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θq ´ ujpαj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θstjrdθ ˆ dt´js ě 0
(3) Vjrtjs “ Rj for every player j and type tj P T 1j .
Since ai P Ri by design, it follows from Proposition 4 that for any type ti P TB,qi , the action
ai P Ski rtis for every k, and hence ai P S8i rtis, as desired.
Fix an arbitrary player j, aj P Rj , type tj P TB,qj , and αj P ∆pAjztajuq. Define a´j : Θ Ñ A´j
to satisfy
a´jpθq P argmax
a´jPR´j
pujpaj , a´j , θq ´ ujpαj , a´j , θqq @θ P Θ
Further define
hpθq :“ ujpaj , a´jpθq, θq ´ ujpαj , a´jpθq, θq @θ P Θ. (26)
Let σ´j : ΘˆTB,q´j Ñ ∆pA´jq be any conjecture with the property that σ´jpθ, t´jq is a point mass
at a´ipθq for every pθ, t´jq P Θˆ TB,1´j . The conjectures σ´jpθ, t´jq for pθ, t´jq R Θˆ TB,1´j are not
explicitly specified. By definition,
suppσ´jpθ, t´jq Ď R´j @pθ, t´jq P Θˆ TB,1´j .
Then
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ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpaj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js ´
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpαj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js
“
˜ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpaj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js `
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpaj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js
¸
´˜ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpαj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js `
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpαj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js
¸
“
˜ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpaj , a´jpθq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js ´
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpαj , a´jpθq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js
¸
`˜ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpaj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js ´
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpαj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js
¸
“
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
hpθqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js`˜ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpaj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js ´
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
ujpαj , σ´jpθ, t´jq, θqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js
¸
ě
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
hpθqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js ´M
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
tjrdθ ˆ dt´js
where the final inequality follows from the definitions of h (as given in (26)) and M (as given in
(24)).
In the proof of Lemma 6, we showed that the inequality in (25) implies
ş
Θ hpθqt1j rdθs ě δ8 ´
2Mξ. Since moreover tj assigns probability at least p to the set T
1´j , we can further boundż
ΘˆTB,1´j
hpθqtjrdθ ˆ dt´js `M
ż
ΘˆT 1´j
tjrdθ ˆ dt´js ě qpδ8 ´ 2Mξq ´ p1´ qqM
Thus, aj is a best reply for type tj so long as
qpδ8 ´ 2Mξq ´ p1´ qqM ě 0
which simplifies to  ď δ8q´p1´qqM2Mξq This bound holds across all players j and actions aj P T 1j .
Thus
pnpaiq ě Pn
˜#
zn : sup
µPM
dP pµpznq, µ8q ď δ
8q ´ p1´ qqM
2Mξq
+¸
ě 1´ 2Mξp
δ8q ´ p1´ qqM E
˜
sup
µPM
dP pµpZnq, µ8q
¸
using Markov’s inequality in the final line.
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